DateTime
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Author
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Posting
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10/25/00 14:40 |
Peter Thompson |
In the early part of the
year I updated my ABS and CTC lists for the NP. I have also done considerable research on any Interlocking
towers in the states of Washington, Idaho and Montana. My next
task is to go through a detailed
document of interlockings which is GN, but which has a large number
of locations which include NP trackage. If anyone has any interest in this
topic and would like some involvement I
would be happy to share the finished research material. There is no
doubt at all the weak areas are the Dakota's and the area around the
Twin Cities. Any help on locating the towers, with any
detail would be very much
appreciated. The best source
often for the long gone towers are timetables, I have a few but not old enough to help. I was lucky
with the Milwaukee as I have
details of their
interlockings from a book they published in 1931. There were no such
books as far as I know produced by the NP. In the three western stated while I have the basic
information on the towers details are less easy to come by. So if
anyone has information on the
towers Helena, Butte,
Sappington, Garrison, Belgrade and a number of others again I
would welcome any help.
Compiler C Frissell |
|
10/05/02 6:18 |
Peter Thompson |
In the last week I have
been looking at some items of interest in the eastern part of
the NP empire. It has raised some questions |I am hoping the list might answer for me if they can. 1) The first question relates to
Tenstrike station on the line between
Bemidji and International Falls. Their is a signal mounted on the
depot roof which appears to be a train order
signal. This one though is not the two
arm ones I am familiar with
(eg Lester, WA ) This looks like when the operator wants a train to stop for orders it is moved from its normal
position face showing to the track
to the signal being rotated through 90 degrees thus facing the oncoming train. Any clarification on this would be
helpful. 2) The second question
relates to St Anthony Park Jct which was on an NP line between St
paul and Minneapolis. This controlled the junction between the NP
line and the Minnesota
Transfer RR (I think) Was this the second tower at this location? When did the first tower built and when did it
have the fire? Was the second tower built in the war
years and has anyone dates for
opening and closing? last
question has anyone any idea what type of plant was used? 3) The last question relates to the
signal arrangements at the Manitoba Jct
(between Detroit Lakes & Fargo). The lever frame which looks like
a US & S type was located in
the depot building. There are some strange metal boxes linked to certain levers on the frame. I
can only think they may be some
sort of electrical link for
the semaphore signals located some distance from the lever frame. I am very likely way of in this.
Any details on this location and
the mystery metal boxes would again be much appreciated. St Anthony Park Jct, Manitoba Jct,
Detroit Lakes, Fargo, Minnesota Transfer RR, Bemidji, International Falls,
Tenstrike, Lester Compiler C Frissell |
|
10/05/02 19:49 |
Bob Montbriand |
Re: interlocking plants - can't give you much detail, but
NP had an interlocking plant at
White Bear Lake, MN where SOO line crossed, and one at Bemidji, Mn where NP crossed the GN and
SOO. Most of the stations
between Brainerd and Intl Falls (old M&I line) were equipped with the train order boards - I
believe we referred to them as
a" two position Swift semaphore" when I worked at Tenstrike
and other stations on that line in
1949 and later. Even though when displayed it showed a RED BOARD it was commonly interpreted as a
"19" signal. While working
at Littlefork in the early 50s I expressed to the RM/TM my concern that there was a potential hazard in such
an interpretation when an order was
issued which restricted the authority of the train at that station (31 order), and suggested that we commence to
display the proper signal for a
"19" order, which in my view was a yellow flag hung below
the red board. The following week the
RM/TM made a special run from Brainerd to Intl Falls with a station wagon full of yellow flags
equipped with wires with which to
hang them to the red boards. White Bear Lake, Minnesota, Soo Line, Junction, Bemidji, GN.
Great Northern Brainerd,
International Falls, M&I,
Tenstrike, 1949, Littlefork Compiler
C Frissell |
|
05/12/03 14:29 |
Bill Kuebler |
> What > I want to
know is if the light box on semaphores the
> engineer > would be
looking at would be turned on only for the
> first > semaphore he
would see or would two semaphores in the
> distance turn on? If we could time travel and ride in the > dome
> car night on tangent track and be looking at the signals > ahead > the answer to this would be known instantly. So
without > that > technology maybe someone can remember
or knows. Not a NP signal engineer,
but I did have the privilege of making a few block signal tests with Glenn
Staeheli right after he came to my area, and some of those tests involved
semaphores. For those
unfamiliar...Glenn was not a signal man, either. His block "tests" were tests not of the signal
system, but of locomotive engineers. As a Road Foreman of Engines, he was
supposed to test every road engineer whom he supervised every so many days.
Although some RFEs would either not bother with these, or if they did them at
all, they'd make their tests at known spots so that the crews got used to it
and were ready for them (and hence they were not really tests), Glenn played
it all by the book. He played hardball all the way and, in fact, made a game
of it. His tests were seldom repeated on the same man at the same place. He
would intentionally try to target an engineer in a way and at a location
where the engineman would least suspect it. In one case, he actually tested
train 25 twice the same night, within a distance of 10 or 15 miles. He
figured the engineer might have expected the first test, but definitely not
the second. We first set shunts at the second spot, then at the first spot,
and as soon as we saw that the engineer made the stop okay at the first spot,
we raced off to the next spot and got there just in time to observe that one,
too. After it was all over, we had to go back and get those shunts. I know
that engineer real well, and he got very irate about the two-test deal, and
got so mad at Glenn later that night at Jamestown (the two men met some time
after the end of the engineer's run) that I was shocked. I had never known
that engineer to get mad at anybody. He was way out of character that night.
Glenn...he just stood there and smiled. He finally shrugged his shoulders and
walked off. He was still playing his "game" and having fun.
Incidentally, the engineer in question passed both tests just fine. He had an
excellent reputation.
Anyway...during some of these tests, I asked Glenn a bunch of questions
regarding block signal circuits, including the approach lighting feature of
the semaphores. Good ol' Glenn was always glad to give Kuebler a lesson in
Railroading 101, so...one time we set his shunts in the track at a certain
spot, then drove to the next two sets of signals. Observation: only the signal at the departure end of the "occupied" block was lighted (at
both departure ends, too, in single track territory). The next one after that
was dark. We did this in a couple of other locations and observed the same
result. There may have been
exceptions, as there so often are, but as a general rule it appears as if the
approach lighting feature included only one signal at a time in a given
direction. As for seeing semaphore
lights from a distance, that's another story. In the NP days (not like today
on MRL), those lights were very dim as compared with the searchlights. In all
the cab trips I made across the Fargo Division at night--on the longest, most
level, straightest track on NP's system--I can tell you with certainty that I
was never able to see a semaphore's light more than about a mile away, if
that, even on clear, moonless nights. Usually the distance at which I could
first see the light was just a little less the length of the block, because I
don't ever remember actually seeing the light "come on". We would
approach the signal and at some point it would first be seen and already was
lit. This was something I had been curious about anyway, so I looked for this
nuance countless times...and always got about the same result. I was also
curious as to how useful the position of the arm would be at night. It was
very visible and prominent under the glare of the locomotive headlight. With
an F-unit's main (lower) headlight on, the semaphore arm would seem to be
just about at the outer edge of the round light beam...just inside that beam,
and the arm would "go dark"
(outside the beam) when we were about three
car lengths from the signal. In fact, there were several instances,
mostly involving curves or places where I wasn't really looking hard for the
signal light, where by the time I
noticed the signal light, the headlight was close enough to light up the arm anyway, and so I saw
the arm and light at practically the
same time. An example of this was coming westbound into Sanborn. The east
switch of the eastward siding there was at the end of a left-hand curve
(going west), and by the time I saw the signal light, I could see the entire
mast and arm too. (This one was a square arm, account a spring switch there.)
Crews who knew where all the signals where (and eventually I did, too) knew
where to look, sometimes across curves like at Sanborn, and typically would
be able to make out the light before the arm could be seen by headlight.
Semaphore arms and lights were generally not "turned" to face a
train across a curve, but searchlights were turned. They were
"focused" or aimed at some point across a curve, depending on
conditions and track speed on that curve. Sometimes it could be quite an
angle. The nighttime sighting
distance of the light on searchlights was a different story. On the long
tangent west of Fargo at night, several searchlights could been seen at once,
even though some of the block lengths had been increased since the semaphore
days. The searchlights were not approach lit, either. They were always lit.
Coming west out of Fargo I think we could see at least three or four blocks
on a clear night. Beyond that distance, it was likely that, if you could see
that far, the line of sight of two consecutive distant signals were be nearly
coincident, so as to make two signals look like one. The Great Northern line between
Breckenridge and Moorhead, and between Fargo and New Rockford was yet another
story. Rode both lines in cabs and
those color lights were almost as bright as the search lights, but they were
approach lit. Again, only one block
in advance--and that *was* consistent, too. I cannot recall any more than
only one block signal ahead with its light on at our approach, even in flat, tangent
territory. And in the case of the GN color lights on straight track, I could
actually see them light up. Quite obvious.
Back to Glenn... I was with
him one time on a signal test in 1970, right after merger. Broad daylight,
nice day. He tested a local coming off a branch onto GN's Surrey Line through
New Rockford. It was a GN crew. As they approached the junction, we and our
car were hidden behind some bushes about a
quarter mile away, so they didn't know it was a test--and given the "good ol' boy club"
atmosphere that had been prevailing
on that GN territory in the years before merger, the very last thing they expected was any kind of signal test. (Glenn said he nearly quit his job
over the looseness and unprofessionalism that had thoroughly invaded those
enginemen, thanks, he said, to some terrible supervision by RFEs. He told me
stories that made my hair stand on end, and, in one case, with Glenn in the
cab (!!), the engineer of the Empire Builder nearly ran them head-on into a
coal train--while wide awake and sober--by RELEASING the brakes as the train
rolled at 20 mph toward the foul point at the end of a siding just as the head end of the coal train approached the switch. The engineer acted
as if he wasn't even aware they were about to die. Glenn had to jump over the
control stand to big hole it for the man. Unbelievable.) Anyway, the head brakeman on the local
approaching the junction was relatively new to the job. As they came around
the left-hand curve toward the junction with an ex-GN Geep (long end running forward, so the engineer
couldn't see diddly squat around the curve, and thus couldn't see the signals) the old-head engineer asked the
brakeman, "How's it look?"
--meaning, how's the absolute signal governing our entrance to the main track at the junction? The brakeman
thought he had been asked, "Do you see any opposing trains coming at us
on the main line?" Since he saw no trains, he answered, "Clear!" but not at all in reference to
the absolute signal. Ooops. Glenn had set his shunt and they were approaching a double
red absolute. But.... the "old
head" engineer didn't get to be an old head for nothing. He had lots of
experience, and he was smart enough to know that the brakey's answer was as
ambiguous as his question to him had been. Plus, there was something in the
brakeman's tone of voice that indicated a miscommunication just might have
occurred. So, the engineer got up, casually walked over to the left side of
the cab, and peered out at a double red getting bigger fast. He instantly
came to life! He leaped back across the cab and, according to the brakeman
who told us this a few minutes later, in one flying leap of a move big-holed
it. The Geep and ten or so cars came to a screeching halt--literally one foot from the signal's insulated joints.
Though the front coupler of the engine was past the signal mast, technically,
they had not run the signal. The
engineer saw Glenn and me drive up in his company car, and he crawled off
that engine visibly shaken. The brakeman was still too ignorant to be shaken.
The engineer thought he had run the signal, it was that close. There was
Glenn...down on all fours by the engine's lead axle, pointing out that they
had stopped with one foot to spare.
After we got the story from them as to what exactly had happened in
the cab, Glenn said something like, "Today's your lucky day. Go have a
good trip home fellas..." No lecture about calling signals or the like.
Glenn figured they had learned their lesson from what had happened, and there
was nothing more he could add. But all the way home, all he could talk about
was the fact that that was "the closest" he had ever seen an
engineer come to running a signal without actually running it. I will never forget the look on that
engineer's face when he crawled out of that cab. signal practices, traffic control, approach lighting, Glenn
Staeheli, block tests Compiler C Frissell |
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05/13/03 16:51 |
Bill Kuebler |
As far as I know, all the semaphores that were absolute signals
were also approach lit. In fact, I observed this myself at Bismarck's NP-Soo
interlocking. They all had the same essential components and design as ABS
semaphores. The lamps on NP's
semaphores were not exactly the same as the ones on NP's searchlights. I
don't recall if the bulb was the same wattage or not, but there's more to it
than just bulb power. The type of reflector and lens has a lot to do with it
too. MRL's current semaphores are not the like the NP ones were. MRL's have
much stronger bulbs, or at least they appear much brighter. I was very
surprised at how bright they are when I first saw one. As for block tests of engine crews, I
don't know how far back the practice went on the NP, but I'm almost positive
it preceded the beginning of the diesel era by a long time, based on comments
I heard from a number of different RFEs down through the years. Glenn's
approach to the whole thing was "by the book." I.e., he did it the
way it was intended to be done all along. It was those RFEs that didn't do it
the way Glenn (and some others too) did it who deviated from the higher level
officials' expectations and accepted
practices. Glenn was by no means the only one who did it that way. He
was just one who did. It is possible that most did not, however, or did it in
a more "lazy" fashion.
Glenn's way took a lot of time and effort on his part. Remember, too, that Glenn likely spent a
good amount more of time on his job in general than did others. I knew him to
put in 75-hour weeks in his Fargo days, which was probably about the same as
in his previous RFE days. He really took railroading seriously, and he also
loved it at the hobby level, too.
signal practices, traffic control, approach lighting, MRL, Soo Line,
Glenn Staeheli Compiler C Frissell |
|
05/16/03 19:20 |
Bill Kuebler |
>I guess these shunts were piece of cable connecting > both rails or > contacts at the signal box? The shunts that Glenn used were home
made. He had taken two C-clamps and
connected them with a fairly strong cable that was about five or six feet long. To set the shunts, he simply clamped one of the C-clamps to one
rail and the other C-clamp to the
other rail. Then, he checked the light of the nearest signal to make sure that it was on, indicating a solid shunt had been created. Then, he would
go and hide nearby and watch the
show. > At least they served
to simulate a train > sitting on
the track. From the way you tell this story the > shunts > stayed
in place even after the approaching train made its > stop and >
proceded. Question for me is how could theengineer proceed > by a red > signal. Yes, the
shunts remained in place. The signal in question was an automatic block signal displaying red. The signal mast had a number plate, so the signal was
not an absolute signal. Therefore,
the indication associated with the aspect
of the signal was "stop and proceed." The applicable
rule for "stop and proceed"
indications stated that the train (or
engine) was to stop "before any part of the train or engine passed the signal" and then proceed
through the next block (the block
immediately beyond, and protected by, the red signal) at "restricted speed", which had a lengthy definition, the gist of which was to be
prepared to stop short of any
abnormality or condition requiring the train to stop, and in any case not to exceed 15 MPH. > The shunts were still there so no
"all clear" could be > obtained
by the signal aspect. What exactly were the rules > how he > could
pass that signal to get to the next one without > removing the >
shunts? > .... > > But.... the "old head"
engineer didn't get to be an old >
head > > for nothing. He had
lots of experience, and he was smart
> > > enough to know
that the brakey's answer was as ambiguous
> as > > his question
to him had been. Plus, there was something
> in > > the
brakeman's tone of voice that indicated a
> > miscommunication just might have occurred. So, the > engineer > > got up, casually walked over to the left side of
the > cab, > > and peered out at a double red
getting bigger fast. > > You say this brakeman was newbie. So
he might not have > followed the > rules properly. I think I remember a
rule saying that > signal
aspects > had to be called out by
everyone (?) in the cab. Is that >
true? If he > had done that this
incident would not have gone this way.
> The > question is
probably also the answer here. Yes,
if he had followed the rules to the letter, and the engineer had done the same, the incident might have been different. The NP and other roads had a
rule that required the crewmembers in
the cab to call signals to each other.
Glenn was a stickler for that rule, and whenever he was in the cab, he expected the crews to follow
it perfectly. Other RFEs were
probably similar, although some were more lenient. > >
.... > > He > > instantly came to life! He leaped
back across the cab > and, > > according to the brakeman who
told us this a few minutes > > > later, in one flying leap of a
move big-holed it. The > Geep > > and ten or so cars came to a
screeching halt--literally >
one > > foot from the signal's
insulated joints. Though the >
front > > coupler of the engine
was past the signal mast, >
technically, > > they had not
run the signal. > .... > I wonder what had happened if the
front axle had passed > the signal
or > whatever the mark was.
Technically, by the rules, they >
would have > overrun the signal
but practically they had made a stop
> being still > at a
safe distance. The rule did not
state that they had to stop "at a safe
distance." The rule stated that they had to stop before
"any part of the engine or train
passed the signal." In some
cases, one could go well beyond the signal and still be "at a safe distance." But that is not
what the rule said. The understood
definition of "pass the signal" in their case was to not go beyond the signal, a point which
pretty much coincided with the wheels
on the insulated joints. As long as a
signal circuit was not occupied by any part of their train (i.e., wheels) when they stopped,
they were deemed to have stopped
before passing the signal. At least, that's the way Glenn handled it. In actual practice, rare was the occasion of it coming down to inches like
that. I suppose a real jerk of an
officer could have faulted them because the
front drawbar was past the signal mast and that, therefore, "a part of their engine" had
indeed passed the signal, but Glenn,
as strict as he was, wasn't about to make such a claim. There are some
supervisor's, however, who would try
something like that. In my line of work, they are few and far between, but almost every one of them
is like that because he's a lousy
pilot and insecure with himself, so he
tries to make up for it by pushing others around with some rule. Glenn might have been a lot of
things, but insecure wasn't one of
them. signal practices, traffic
control, approach lighting, Glenn Staeheli, block tests Compiler
C Frissell |
|
05/16/03 19:26 |
Bill Kuebler |
> The shunts that Glenn
used were home made. He had taken
> two > C-clamps and
connected them with a fairly strong cable
> that > was about five
or six feet long. To set the shunts, he
> simply clamped one of the C-clamps to one rail and the > other > C-clamp to the other rail. I meant to say that he clamped them to the base of the
rail. They did not interfere with the
passage of the train's wheels, and the crews would rarely see the clamps or
cable in the track. Glenn had a dark brown rubber insulation around the cable
for its entire length, so it would be harder to see. The clamps were not
shiny. signal practices, traffic
control, approach lighting, Glenn Staeheli, block tests Compiler
C Frissell |
|
05/20/03 23:50 |
Bill Kuebler |
The recent thread about
block signal testing brought a very
strange incident to mind. As one might expect, engine crews passed the vast majority of block tests
that were thrown at them, so tests
that were "flunked" stand out in the memories of the RFEs that had to deal with them.
One such flunk occurred with a
certain engineer that Glenn Staeheli
nicknamed (for purposes of telling this story) "John Barleycorn." Although I knew him
quite well, his real name can remain
undisclosed. The nickname, as it suggests, had to do with his bad alcohol habit that, in the later years of his career, affected his work. This was
the guy who, with his fireman,
"stole" a GP-9 and ran it down the NP's Southwestern Branch from Fargo to some town several miles down the branch. They had no clearance or
running order, they ran with no
headlight, bell, or any such thing, and
they exceeded speed limits. In short, they went on a big joy ride. Apparently, this took place after a
little "celebration" at the
end of their run on the Southwestern.
Instead of entering the main line at Fargo and heading for Dilworth, they uncoupled from their train,
left it standing in the yard where
the branch enters the main, and took off
with the engine back down the branch. It all ended well enough, but it was rather hair-raising for
a while. At one point a division
trainmaster set out to derail them at a
certain spot if they hadn't stopped by the time they reached that spot. They did stop, however. Anyway...several years after that
incident, John Barleycorn was in
chain gang service, and Glenn went out one evening to block test him. Glenn set his shunts, then
went and hid in his car as usual.
Along came Barleycorn with a tonnage
train. The track was straight and slightly ascending grade (almost level). As Barleycorn approached
the red block signal, it appeared as
if he had his train under control
and, as expected, he continued to slow as he got closer to the signal. This was obviously going to be
a normal stop in plenty of time.
Glenn sat in his car half-bored. But
then...just as the train got to within ten car lengths or so of the signal--and the train was by then
down to a crawl--the brakes released!
Worse, even though he still could
have stopped in time, Barleycorn made no attempt to do so. The train just crawled past the signal
at about four miles per hour. When it
was several car lengths past the
signal, it finally stopped. Test flunked. At first, Glenn just sat and gawked at this scene, unbelieving. (Truth be told, he
practically bit off the end of his
pipe.) He went from boredom to shock in mere seconds. So...after recovering some of his
composure, Glenn drove over to the
engine immediately. The train was still standing there when he arrived at the lead unit. He climbed into
the cab and went through his ritual
of identifying himself and then the
crew, then asking what they saw, what they did, if they called the signals to each other, etc. etc. He also checked John Barleycorn for the smell of
alcohol. Amazingly, engineer B was
entirely sober! He hadn't had a drop for a
couple of days. The head brakeman was sober, too. This breach of the rules had nothing to do with
Rule G. Glenn asked them why they ran
the signal, but apparently the two
were without any sensible answer. They just shrugged their shoulders and mumbled incoherently,
leaving Glenn utterly bewildered.
Both men claimed that they were wide awake.
Besides, the hour was early enough in the evening, and the men's history of recent service was such
that they were not likely to be prone
to fatigue at the time of the test. The
whole thing was a mystery, and it remained a complete mystery. When I talked to Glenn about it
once again a few months before he
died in 1995, he was still wondering why
they did that. Barleycorn
and his brakeman were given discipline (I think it was 30 days). Very shortly thereafter, John B retired, albeit early, and a few years later he
died of liver problems. The strangest things can happen at the
least expected times. That is
something that anybody involved in rail (or air) transportation learns very early in one's career. signal practices, traffic control,
approach lighting, Glenn Staeheli, block tests, discipline, crews Compiler
C Frissell |